Jewish theology has no clearly elaborated views on the relationship between body and soul, nor on the nature of the soul itself. Apart from Jewish philosophical and kabbalistic literature on the subject, the major traditional sources for any normative doctrines are the various texts in talmudic and midrashic literature. These latter are not systematic, nor is their interpretation generally agreed on. The talmudic rabbis, as opposed to certain Jewish philosophers of the medieval period, never considered views on such a purely theoretical subject as important. Their interest was focused on the connected, but more practically orientated beliefs, such as in the resurrection of the body and G-d's future judgment. For the talmudic rabbis the soul is, in some sense, clearly separable from the body: G-d breathed the soul into the body of Adam (Gen. 2:7; Ta'an. 22b). During sleep the soul departs and draws spiritual refreshment from on high (Gen. R. 14:9). At death it leaves the body only to be united with it again at the resurrection (Sanh. 90b–91a). As a prayer of the morning liturgy, uttered on awakening, expresses it: "O my G-d, the soul which thou gavest me is pure; thou didst create it, thou didst form it, thou didst breathe it into me. Thou preservest it within me, and thou wilt take it from me, but wilt restore it unto me hereafter" (Hertz, Prayer, 19). Whether the soul is capable of living an independent, fully conscious existence away from the body after death is unclear from rabbinic sources. The Midrash puts it somewhat vaguely - that the body cannot survive without the soul - nor the soul without the body (cf. Tanh. Va-Yikra 11). Although a view is found maintaining that the soul after death is in a quiescent state (Shab. 152b), the predominant view seems to be that the soul is capable of having a fully conscious life of its own when disembodied (see, for instance, Ket. 77b; Ber. 18b–19a). It is even maintained that the soul pre-exists the body (Hag. 12b); but how this predominant view is to be interpreted is problematic. Since the various anecdotes and descriptions about the soul in its disembodied state are given in terms of physical imagery, it might be assumed that an ethereal body was ascribed to the soul, enabling it to parallel the most important functions of its embodied state when disembodied. This assumption is unwarranted, however, since the rabbis do not seek conceptual coherence in their theological speculation. Imagery has a homiletic, rather than a speculative, function.

The elliptical and practically oriented aspect of rabbinic teaching is brought out further in the view that the soul is a guest in the body here on earth (Lev. R. 34:3), for this means that the body must be respected and well treated for the sake of its honored guest. The Gnostic idea of the body as a prison of the soul is absent from rabbinic literature; body and soul form a harmonious unity. Just as G-d fills the world, sees but is not seen, so the soul fills the body, sees but is not seen (Ber. 10a). On the eve of the Sabbath G-d gives each man an extra soul, which He takes back at its termination (Bez. 16a). This is the rabbinic way of emphasizing the spirituality of the soul, its closeness in nature to G-d, and the extra spirituality with which it is imbued on the Sabbath. The soul is pure as G-d is pure; its introduction into the human embryo is G-d's part in the ever-renewed creation of human life (Nid. 31a). Because G-d originally gave man his soul, it is for G-d to take it away and not man himself. Thus suicide, euthanasia, and anything which would hasten death is forbidden (Job 1:21; Av. Zar. 18a and Tos.; Sh. Ar. YD 345). If man safeguards the purity of his soul by walking in the ways of the Torah, all will be well, but if not G-d will take his soul from him (Nid. 31a). For his sins, which contaminate the soul, man will be judged; indeed his soul will be his accuser. Nor can the body plead that it was the soul which sinned, nor the soul blame the body, for at the resurrection G-d will return soul to body and judge them as one. To illustrate this, the Talmud has the following parable: an orchard owner appointed a lame man and a blind man to guard his orchard, thinking that because of his defect each one would be incapable of any mischief. However the two guardians contrived, by means of the lame man sitting on the shoulders of the blind one, to steal and eat the fruit. When accused each pleaded his innocence, the one pointing to his inability to see and the other to his inability to walk. The orchard owner put the lame man on the blind man's shoulders and passed judgment on them thus (Sanh. 91a; Tanh. Va-Yikra 12).

חלק א: וויכוח. חלק ב: חידושים בש"ס ובפוסקים. הסכמות: ר' ישראל [משקלוב], צפת, תקצ"ה; ר' זרחיה ניסים אזולאי, צפת, אדר תקצ"ו; ר' אברהם אנהירי, צפת, חי אדר תקצ"ה; ר' שלמה זלמן טיקטין, ברעסלויא, לב למב"י [יז אייר] תקצ"ט; ר' דוב בער מייזלס, קראקא, יט מנחם-[אב] תקצ"ח.